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Effect of US Policies on Offshore Oil Leasing, 1983-2006:  
A Random Parameter Logit Regression Analysis 
 
Abstract. The purpose of this study is to determine the effects of Minerals Management 
Service policy on Outer Continental Shelf leasing between 1983 and 2006. We apply a 
discrete choice model to a large, recently-developed spatial data set and examine factors 
that influence leasing such as royalty rates, policy, and exogenous land characteristics. In 
a time of soaring energy prices, we also focus on the effect of increased royalties on 
offshore production. We focus on offshore policies subsequent to 1983 with a flexible 
Random Parameters Logit model. Variables such as oil prices, net income, distance, 
geographical proxies and weather variables influence bidding in expected ways. We 
include the second moment of parameter distributions with the Random Parameter Logit 
model to avoid erroneous conclusions about the effects of government policy on bidding.  
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Introduction 
The Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) is thought to have great potential to 
supplement US long-term energy needs. The US Minerals Management Service (MMS) 
oversees the leasing and revenue collection for the OCS. For oil and gas specifically, 
offshore tracts of land are leased to private companies, giving them rights to explore, 
drill, and develop any petroleum resources. In the lease auctions, the bidding is by cash 
bonus, and later lessees pay royalties on any production.  As a policy tool, the 
government is able to adjust the royalties, lease terms, and sale process.   
With the surge in worldwide oil prices in the seventies, several studies emerged to 
bridge our understanding of optimal fiscal policy in the OCS. First, Reece (1978) 
developed a bidding model that analyzed various fiscal policies and corresponding effects 
on bidding. Due to lack of adequate pre-sale information, bidding in the OCS may not 
lead to a socially optimal outcome. As such, a government subsidy to mitigate presale 
uncertainty is recommended. Debrock et al. (1983) next investigated the effects of joint 
bidding and information pooling on petroleum lease auctions, finding that the pooling of 
information from joint bidding added to the value of tracts that received bids and 
provided industry with more accurate resources assessments. Although joint bidding 
reduced the number of participants, the increased a priori information resulted in more 
aggressive bidding and government revenues.  
Moody et al. (1990) examined the welfare effects of switching from the tract-
nomination sale process to area-wide leasing in 1983 with a discrete choice two-stage 
probit analysis. The analysis showed that the 1983 change to area-wide leasing, which   3
increased the number of tracts offered, resulted in a higher supply of petroleum on the 
world market. The increased supply caused oil prices to drop- resulting in a transfer of 
wealth from onshore coastal to offshore producers. Also noted was the reduction in 
government revenues due to lower oil prices.   
Hendricks et al. (1999) examined federal auctions for wildcat leases in the OCS 
by constructing a test of equilibrium bidding.  The authors found that auction participants 
tend to bid less aggressively when they expect more competition, since the expectations 
for winning the given lease were perceived as lower with greater participation. More 
recently, Hendricks et al. (2004) investigated the effects of bidding rings and the winners 
curse. The authors provide insight on why there is a low occurrence of joint bidding on 
marginal properties in the OCS for federal auctions, providing empirical evidence that 
fear of the winner’s curse may cause participants not to trade, and lead to inefficient 
outcomes.  
  The implications of the prior studies are, first, fiscal policy does indeed affect 
OCS bidding. Second, fiscal policy is necessary to ensure a competitive sale in a very 
concentrated industry such as oil and gas. Lastly, there are important distributional 
consequences when fiscal policy in the OCS is created, as some firms may benefit from 
regulation and some may not.  
  The purpose of this study is to determine the effects of MMS policy on OCS 
leasing between 1983 and 2006. We apply a discrete choice model to a large, recently-
developed spatial data set and examine factors that influence leasing such as royalty rates, 
policy, and exogenous land characteristics. In a time of soaring gasoline prices, we also 
focus on the effect of increased royalties on offshore production. Our analysis adopts an   4
approach similar to Moody; however, we focus on offshore policies subsequent to 1983 
with a flexible Random Parameters Logit (RPL) model using newly available bidding 
data (IIC, Inc 2004). The RPL model allows not only for heterogeneity of choice across 
firms but also heterogeneity of all unobserved components (Louviere et al. 2001). Thus, 
modeling the unobserved component of choice increases the explanatory power of our 
bidding model, as well as provides further insights into the leasing process itself.  
In the rest of the paper we present a conceptual model that shows how an 
individual firm would choose to bid on a given OCS tract based on observable and 
unobservable attributes. We next discuss the data used to develop an empirical model that 
predicts bidding in the OCS and present results. Lastly, policy suggestions are discussed.  
Conceptual Framework  
Consider the general case of the Random Utility Model (RUM). Let qj U be the 
utility associated with the 
th q firm for alternative j. The observable portion of utility, qj V , 
is known as the deterministic component. Assuming Independently and Identically 
Distributed (IID) errors, we write the indirect utility function as 
qj qj q qj qj X U ε β α + + =                        ( 1 )  
where  qj q qj X V β = ,  qj X  are the attributes for the q
th firm for tract choice j and  q β  is the 
associated parameter. The term qj ε  is stochastic and thus unobservable, but known to the 
decision maker;  qj α  is the alternative specific constant for the q
th firm for tract j. The 
expression in (1) is useful because it allows us to dissect the random and nonrandom 
characteristics that influence utility; however, the IID assumption is a major shortcoming. 
Louviere et al. (2001) notes that IID based models assume that these random effects are   5
constant, and do not vary among firms.  Since probability distributions have more that 
one moment, it is reasonable to investigate the role of the unobservable component of 
utility on choice. The IID assumption restricts the utility of alternatives to be uncorrelated 
and have the same variance.  In addition, the common value of error variance is not a 
function of individual characteristics so it is the same across firms.  In effect, the IID 
based models assume that the distribution of the unobservable components are constant 
across firms, and cannot systematically influence choice.   
We now consider a model that allows the distribution of unobservable effects to 
vary across individual firms. As such, now extend (1) to include heterogeneous 
preferences: 
      
qj qj q qj q qj qj X X U ε γ β α + + + =         ( 2 )  
 
where  ) , ( ~ Ω μ γ N and q β and  q γ are the nonrandom and random parameters in the utility 
function for firm q, respectively. All other parameters are previously defined. We can 
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 where  q ℜ is an underlying function of the  qj X vector and is the individual specific 
random disturbance of the unobserved heterogeneity. The parameter  q γ illustrates the   6
effects of individual specific attributes in the population that have a statistically 
significant effect on utility. The tastes and preferences of individual firms are embodied 
in this parameter.  
  The following is an example of how unobserved tract attributes can influence bid 
choice and be captured to better understand the behavioral choice process. Each firm will 
receive utility from bidding on a tract based on observable and unobservable 
characteristics. Suppose that q companies are bidding on the j
th OCS tract. Now consider 
that  q β is the parameter associated with water depth. Assuming IID, the probability that 
the q
th firm will choose j is based on the observable water depth and other unobservable 
influences. The second moment of  q β  will be identical across firms.  
However, consider the situation where the variance of parameter estimates are 
allowed to be ‘free’ over two firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2. The second derivative of   q γ  is 
2
qj σ  and can be a unique function of observed water depth Yqj for the q
th firm.  Notice this 
implies a unique distribution of utility for each Firm for each tract alternative. As such, 
the second moment of  q γ are uniquely distributed across Firms 1 and 2. 
Now suppose Firm 1 is a much smaller company compared to Firm 2. Firm 1’s 
individual specific attribute is their budget, which interacts with water depth (i.e., deeper 
water is a proxy for greater risk and a higher share of the budget and Firm 1 is less likely 
to bid). However, Firm 2 is very large and makes bidding decisions regardless of water 
depth. If IID is assumed, the parameter estimates will be inconsistent; an omitted variable 
will be correlated with observable water depth for Firm 1 but not for Firm 2- the second 
moment of water depth will vary across firms. The parameter obtained in the regression 
would be confounded with an additional parameter and the researcher may lead to   7
erroneous conclusions. However, if the distribution of  q γ is allowed to be ‘free’ as a 
random parameter, it can be captured and used to better understand the behavioral 
process of choice underlying OCS tract selection.  
    Louviere et al. (2002) noted several practical considerations when taking into 
account the effect of unobserved effects on choice. First, variability in the stochastic 
component of utility is associated with numerous factors, and it is naïve to lump all 
unobserved effects into a single error term, assuming these differences are due solely to 
heterogeneity between individuals.  Second, response variability is as much a behavioral 
phenomenon as response means. Third, coefficient estimates are confounded with error 
variance in the RUM, and empirical parameter estimates may actually be due to the mean 
of the response, the variability of the response, or both. The Random Parameter Logit 
(RPL) is one modeling approach that relaxes the assumption of IID errors, and allows all 
unobserved components of utility to predict bid choice.  Using this approach we are able 
to model unobserved heterogeneity, as opposed to assuming it is a constant and treating it 
as a nuisance. Modeling the unobserved component of choice is hypothesized to increase 
the explanatory power of our modeling capabilities, as well as our insights into the 
behavioral choice process.  
Data and Method 
We utilize publicly available data for OCS issued leases, sold in 1983-2006. Data 
include various tract characteristics such as location, water depth, royalty rates, proven 
tracts, and any prior leasing or development at the same location. As a result of recent 
extensive spatial analysis conducted by the authors
1, relationships such as distance to 
nearest discovery and distance to nearest active lease are available for the first time and 
                                                 
1 Data for the spatial analysis was obtained from the public website www.mms.gov.    8
included.  A discrete choice model is applied to these data to identify the probability that 
a given tract will be bid on given its characteristics. Specifically, the RPL model is used 
to identify the probability the i
th  firm will bid on lease alternative j with J=1,…, n 
alternatives in the choice set of tracts available.  
  The data consist of panels of bidding decisions between 1983 and 2004 for 15,308 
tracts in the OCS. Each tract is associated with a set of attributes, and are discussed below 
in four categories: distance/geographical variables, tract specific attributes, economic 
variables, and other exogenous characteristics (Table 1). In the following paragraphs we 
specifically enumerate tract characteristics, and identify how we expect the 
characteristics to influence bidding. Each tract in the OCS is associated with a set of 
attributes.  
Distance/Geographical Variables.  
The following variables are hypothesized to influence bidding decisions due to 
the proximity of the given tract to other geological resources. The relevant units in the 
specification of these variables are the distance from one tract to another tract. As a result 
of recent extensive spatial analysis conducted by the authors, relationships such as 
distance to nearest discovery and distance to nearest active lease are available for the first 
time and included.  For example, the distance of 7 is used to approximate the center of a 
given successful tract to another given area two tracts away. The unit of 30 is about ten 
tracts away. The closer the tract in question is to another successful area, we would 
expect a greater effect on firm bidding decisions. 
  We include the geographic/distance variables Fields,  Wells,  Structures, and 
Discoveries. Each variable is unique in physical characteristics and is expected to   9
independently influence bidding. Since many of the following variables may appear 
similar, we tested the correlations of the following and found they were indeed positively 
related- however, the correlation coefficient for each relationship was not large enough to 
be concerned about multicollinearity in the regression analysis. As such, while the 
following geographic proxies appear similar, they do indeed represent unique attributes 
that we expect to contribute to explaining bidding. Also, a limitation of several of the 
leading independent variables is that while they are useful for explaining historical 
impacts of fiscal policy in the OCS they limit the forecasting capabilities of the model.  
Distance is the linear distance from the given tract to another successful tract, 
which we would expect to positively influence bid decisions. The variable Density12 is 
the count of active leases within a twelve mile radius, and should be a proxy for increased 
bidding. Density30 similarly is a count of active leases, but is an approximation of the 
number of active leases that are between 12 and 30 miles. We expect the effect of the 
Density30 variable  to be positive and significant; however, the magnitude of the 
parameter should be smaller than the Density12 parameter since leases closer to active 
leases may represent more profitable tracts. We used 12 and 30 mile increments because 
the distance from the center of a tract to another tract is 3 miles. As such, 12 miles 
represents four tracts out and 30 tells us the radius 10 tracts away.  
VNField  indicates that there is another successful field within 10 miles. NField is 
a tract that is between 10 to 31 miles of a successful field. We expect that the expected 
signs of both regression parameters will be positive. The distance of 10 is a proxy for 
three tracts away from the given tract, and 31 is about ten tracts way. A discovery is a 
field found in the OCS in that particular year. Specifically, VNDiscovery are the data for   10
tracts within 7 miles, and NDiscovery are between 7 and 31 miles. A positive effect is 
reasonable to expect for both variables, since more bidding should occur closer to more 
profitable fields. As noted, 7 mile increments are approximately the distance from two 
tracts, and 31 mile increments are the distance from ten tracts. 
A field is an area scientifically known to have oil and be economically 
recoverable, where economically recoverable is used in this vein to indicate that the firm 
j’s opportunity costs are at least recovered for the given investment. Field7 represents 
areas that are within 7 miles of a known resource, while Fields31 are between 7 and 31 
miles. We hypothesize a positive relationship between bidding and proximity to closer 
fields. Our prediction is that the sign and magnitude for both distance variables will be 
positive and significant; however, we expect the magnitude of Fields7 will be greater 
than Fields31, as Fields7 is the distance from two tracts and should therefore have a 
stronger influence on bidding than Fields31. 
A well is an area where a hole has been drilled. Well31Y4 is a hole that has been 
drilled within the past 4 years, within 7 and 31 miles of a known geological oil field. 
Well7Y4 is a hole that has been drilled within the past 4 years, within 7 miles of a known 
geological oil field. It is likely that a positive regression parameter is obtained for these 
variables in our analysis. DSY2D31 is the distance to a well that was discovered in the 
past two years within 31 miles. A positive relationship with bidding is expected. 
Structures are physical platforms in the OCS. Here we hypothesize that another structure 
within 7 miles, Structures7, would be a factor leading to increased bids.  
Tract Specific Variables   11
Each one of the following variables represents unique information on the tract in 
question. We include information whether the tract was returned the last period, if it has 
successfully produced, the number of prior leases held, and if the reserve price was not 
met last year (bid rejection). Returned(-1) is a discrete lagged variable that indicates if the 
tract was returned last period. It is hypothesized that a returned tract would positively 
influence bidding. PriorLeases is the total number of prior leases for the tract and should 
be directly related to bidding.  Produced is a variable that represents whether the tract 
produced in the subsequent year, and is expected to influence bidding in a positive 
fashion.  
Bids that were rejected last period are represented by Reject(-1). According to 
historical data at MMS, if a bid was not accepted in the prior time period there is a very 
likely chance that there will be a bid in the next period. As such, it would be reasonable 
to expect a positive sign on the regression coefficient for Reject(-1); a rejected bid means 
that government analysts believe that the tract is more valuable, and the winning bid 
should have been higher. However, the rejection could also be correlated with negative 
bidding in the subsequent period, since firms may have already decided in the prior 
period that the tract is not worth bidding on and therefore would not bid in the current 
time period. Plus, there are relatively few instances in the data where MMS rejected bids. 
The small amount of data for this occurrence may not be adequate to draw appropriate 
statistical inferences.  As such, the estimated sign of Reject(-1) is ambiguous.  An 
unexpected sign in the mean of the regression estimate could indicate that the estimated 
parameter is not representative of the entire population. As discussed in the conceptual 
section of this paper, closer examination of the second moment of the given parameter   12
distribution could provide useful information to better understand the behavior process of 
bid choice. 
Economic Variables 
The following variables are included in the analysis to examine the effect of 
market influences on OCS bidding. Several of the following variables are indicators of 
economic phenomena, and present a limitation to this analysis- the model can only be 
used to explain historical effects of fiscal policy in the OCS, but not for prediction 
purposes. We include the price next year for oil, the produce price index, net income, and 
royalty rate.  
 SIC211(5) is the producer price index (PPI) for the oil and gas extraction 
industry. The PPI is a proxy for the overall level of prices in the industry, and hence 
should be positively correlated with bidding activity (Moody et al. 1990). We use a 
leading variable for 5 years to test the hypothesis that prices are important in the future at 
the end of the lease, as resource decisions are based on future periods and not in the 
current year.  The real price of a barrel of oil next year, OilPrice(1), should have a 
significant and direct relationship with bidding decisions.   
NetInc(1) is a leasing variable for net income. Net income for an oil producer is 
defined as the difference between total revenue and total costs, and is hypothesized to 
correspond to bidding in a positive fashion. Royalty is the amount paid to the federal 
government for leasing of land in the OCS, and is defined as a percentage of gross 
production. Royalty is expected to pick up on the variation in the data as a result of 
Royalty Suspension Volumes (RSVs) imposed after the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act 
(DWWRA); i.e., the implicit subsidy to OCS companies for producing in deep water.   13
RSV’s are part of the DWRRA and allow oil companies to produce specified quantities 
of oil royalty-free. The effect of increased royalty should decrease bidding, as royalty is a 
function of input demand for OCS producers. However, many factors in the regression 
analysis related to the RSV may be omitted. As such, the sign on Royalty is ambiguous 
due to the potential for omitted variable bias.  
Other Exogenous Variables.  
In a time of massive weather occurrences, the following data are included to test 
the effect of hurricanes on bidding. USHUR and HUR represent the annual number of 
hurricanes between 1984 and 2003 in the US and Worldwide, respectively. While it is 
obviously challenging to forecast the effect of hurricanes on resource decisions in the 
energy market, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the presence of hurricanes will either 
positively or negatively influence bidding.  From one standpoint, the inevitable effect of 
extreme weather in the OCS is to reduce aggregate supply, push up prices, and hence 
increase bid activity. Following that logic, we would also expect that the magnitude of 
HUR to be larger than USHUR. However, increased hurricane activity could also wipe 
out many of the physical structures in the OCS and therefore reduce capacity and ability 
to acquire capital reducing the overall probability of bidding. As such, the expected effect 
of HUR and USHUR is ambiguous.  The overall effect of HUR and USHUR may have to 
do with the relative increases in capital costs versus the change in the output price of oil 
due to supply restrictions. For example, if the price of factors of production increase by t 
and the exogenous price of oil increases by 2t, then the overall effect on bidding will be 
positive. However, if the price of factors of production increases by 2t and the exogenous 
price of oil increases by t, then the isolated effect of HUR and USHUR on bidding will be   14
negative. As such, the expected result of the exogenous weather parameters is indeed 
ambiguous and is an empirical question.  
Estimation 
The RPL model is a special case of the multinomial logit model (Train 1998). The 
RPL allows for parameters to vary across individuals in the population with the same 
characteristics. Another characteristic of the RPL is the relaxing of the assumption of IID 
errors, implying a completely unrestricted variance-covariance matrix. According to 
equation (3),  q γ is a vector of taste parameters for the 
th q  firm, and has its own unique 
distribution. In this case, preferences are observable to the firm but are random to the 
researcher.  That is, tastes are known to the firm but unknown to the researcher and are a 
vector of random variables.  By allowing for “free-variance”, individual taste parameters 
differ from firm to firm. Following Morey et al. (1993), the unconditional probability of 
choosing alternative j is therefore: 
 
ξ μ ξ ξ π d N X P q qk q ) , | ( ) , ( Ω = ∫
∞
∞ −                      (4) 
 
Also according to Morey et al. (1993) we know 
qj qk q qj qj qj q qj q qj qj X Y X U ε ξ α ε γ β α + + = + + + =  and (, ) N βμΩ is the normal cdf where 
) , ( ~ Ω μ γ N and  qj ε is a random draw from EV1 distribution of errors, and  q γ is the 
correlation across choices for the 
th q individual. 
In this model, a closed solution is not possible and  q π  is generated by a randomly 
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where for the random draw r for the 
th q firm from  (, ) N βμΩ , the coefficients are given 
as 
r
q β . The estimator is simulated Maximum Likelihood and is given as: 
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Maximizing over (6), our dependent variable is the probability of a bid, in the current 
time period, as explained by tract specific attributes, economic variables, and other 
exogenous factors.  
Results 
We present two statistical models to investigate the influence of the DWRRA on 
bidding decisions. The DWRRA provided royalty suspension provisions for tracts in 
water greater than 400 meters. Table 2 presents the base model including 
geographic/distance proxies, tract specific attributes, economic variables, and presence of 
hurricanes. Table 3 shows the slope dummy model to examine the effect of the DWRRA. 
The dummy variable for DWRRA is equal to zero for the time period prior to the policy 
and equal to one subsequent to the policy. As with all slope dummy variables, the policy 
variable can only be multiplied by a continuous variable. As such, we are only able to 
estimate slope dummies for continuous parameters in the model. When the sloped 
dummy model is compared to the base model, the dummy variable can be used to suggest 
if the slope of the parameter is different after the DWRRA. A switching regression model   16
would be more conclusive but the large number of parameters led to convergence 
problems in the RPL.  
  The first result is the high explanatory power of our bidding model (Table 2). 
Since the estimation is maximum likelihood, the appropriate measure of goodness of fit is 
pseudo r-square and the value of 54% is excellent.  In fact, Domencich and McFadden 
(1975) indicated that a pseudo r-square of this value for maximum likelihood is 
comparable to about a 90% goodness of fit in a linear model with Ordinary Least 
Squares. As such, our RUM is a very powerful framework for explaining bidding in the 
OCS.  
  Most of the signs and magnitudes of the estimated parameters are consistent with 
our expectations. The means of estimated parameters for Geographic/ Distance proxies 
such as PriorLeases,  Distance12, and Distance30 are all positive and statistically 
significant at the 99% level. Also the magnitude of the parameter on Distance12 is 
greater than the parameter on Distance30, indicating that closer active leases are more 
likely to receive bids. 
  It is critical to note the importance of the statistical significance of the second 
moment of the parameter distribution for PriorLeases, Distance, VNDiscovery, Fields7, 
Fields31, Well7Y4, and DSY2D31. That is, if a given researcher had assumed IID they 
would have led to erroneous conclusions about the sign, magnitude, or statistical 
significance of the given parameter. For example, consider the case of Distance. The first 
moment of the parameter distribution indicates there is no effect of this variable on 
bidding. The lack of statistical significance is counter intuitive, as we would expect 
distance and bidding to have a positive relationship. Due to the statistical significance of   17
the second moment of the estimated parameter we see that the distribution of this 
parameter varies across decision makers in the data, and there is indeed 
heteroskedasticity present. As such, since non-constant variance in the IID based model 
leads to inconsistent parameter estimates, we cannot draw appropriate statistical 
inferences about the mean of Distance, but do indeed observe that the effect on bidding 
differs across firms.  
  Consider another example with the first moment of the parameter distribution for 
the geographic proxies Fields7, Fields31, Well7Y4 and DSY2D31. If one were to assume 
IID, the assumption would lead to the conclusion that the variables had no effect on 
bidding. However, according to the second moments, the mean of each parameter does 
not represent each data point and hence is incorrect. As such, Fields7, Fields31, Well7Y4 
and DSY2D31 do indeed influence bidding, but the effects of each variable on the 
behavioral process of choice is different across tracts in the data.  
  The effect of the Reject(-1) variable is negative and significant, indicating that a 
given tract in the data is less likely to obtain a bid this period if the reserve price was not 
met last period. According to historical data at MMS, if a bid was not accepted in the 
prior time period there is a very likely chance that there will be a bid in the next period. A 
rejected bid means that analysts believe that the tract is valuable, and the winning bid 
should be higher. However, the rejection could also be correlated with negative bidding 
in the subsequent period, since firms may have already decided in the prior period that 
the tract is not worth bidding on and therefore would not bid in the current time period. 
Plus, there are relatively few instances in the data where MMS rejected a bid. The small 
amount of data for this occurrence may not be adequate to draw appropriate statistical   18
inferences. The negative and significant coefficient for Reject(-1) seems reasonable given 
our data.  
  Generally speaking, our tract specific parameter estimates are statistically 
significant with the expected sign. As discussed, Returned(1) indicates that the given tract 
was going to be returned in the subsequent time period, and was hypothesized to directly 
influence bidding. The positive and significant coefficient confirms our hypothesis Also, 
as expected, PriorLeases is positive and significant, indicating that the more leases a 
given tract had the more likely it would be to receive a bid. The first and second moments  
of the Produced(1) variable are statistically insignificant in explaining bidding. This 
confirms that non-constant error variance is present in our data and ignoring second 
moments of parameter distributions would lead to erroneous conclusions.  
  The effects of the economic variables NetIncome(5) and OilPrice(1) are positive 
and significant.  The positive sign on NetIncome(5) means that bidding decisions are 
based on Net Income in five years. As we discussed, many OCS leases have five year 
terms and we hypothesized that a given firm would make the decision to bid on what 
earnings were expected to be at the end of the lease. Both the first and second moments 
of the parameter distribution for OilPrice(1) are positive and significant. The statistical 
significance of the second moment of OilPrice(1) indicates that the effect of this variable 
is not constant across tracts. The first moment of the parameter distribution for Royalty is 
not significant, but the second moment is significant at the 99% level. The result indicates 
that the DWRRA increased bidding on some tracts, but not on other tracts. 
 The  variable  HUR is positive and statistically significant, indicating increased 
number of worldwide hurricanes has a direct impact on bidding. While that result may   19
seem counterintuitive, we discussed earlier that the sign on this coefficient is ambiguous. 
While weather activity such as hurricanes could inhibit bidding, the reduced supply could 
also push up prices and hence be correlated with more business activity. Hurricanes push 
up prices, and since prices are directly related to bidding, hurricane activity actually 
increases the probability of a bid in the OCS.  
  Table 3 shows the results from our slope dummy model. Slope dummy models are 
useful because they are able to capture the effects of policy variables and the 
corresponding sensitivity in parameter estimates. Specifically the dummy variable for the 
DWRRA is multiplied by the continuous variables. If the estimated coefficient is positive 
bidding is more sensitive to oil prices after the policy. 
  The first interesting difference between the base and slope dummy model is the 
improved goodness of fit. Also, it is important to note the positive and statistical 
significance of many of the slope dummies. For example, dPriorLeases,  dDensity12, 
dDensity30, and dHUR are positive and statistically significant indicating that the effects 
of these parameters on bidding are more sensitive after the DWRRA. Consider the case 
of dPriorLeases. The coefficient estimate of 2.69 indicates that if a tract had one more 
prior lease, the probability of a bid increases by about 2.69%, after the DWRRA.   
  The positive coefficient on the second moments of the parameters distributions 
for dPriorLeases, Reject(-1) dOilPrice(1), dNetInc(5), Royalty, and dUSHUR indicates 
an increased sensitivity to bidding. But, the behavioral phenomena are not equal across 
decision makers in the data. For example, consider the case of dOilPrice(1). The slope 
dummy suggests different magnitudes after DWRRA and the corresponding difference in 
probability of a bid. However, another interesting layer of complexity is that the   20
distribution of this parameter is non-constant across tracts. As such, some tracts post-
DWRRA are more likely to receive a bid with a one unit change in oil price tomorrow, 
but some tracts will not change bidding behavior whatsoever. Plus, if the distribution of 
this parameter were held constant under IID, the researcher would lead to the erroneous 
conclusion that the effect of prices are constant before and after government policy.  
Conclusions  
  This paper has investigated the effects of government policy on oil leasing in the 
OCS. A discrete choice analysis is developed that identifies the probability a given tract 
would be bid on based on exogenous tract characteristics, economic variables, and 
weather. As hypothesized from our theoretical model, economic variables such as oil 
prices and net income directly influence leasing activity. Also, distance and geographical 
proxies and weather variables are shown to positively influence bidding. The analysis is 
unique because we focused on not only the first moment of parameters to effect bid 
choice, but also the second moment. By including the second moment of parameter 
distributions, the model is more robust compared to an IID based analysis. Relaxing IID 
in the discrete choice analysis is critical from a public policy perspective, as the 
econometric restriction may lead decision makers to erroneous conclusions about 
government programs.  
For example, the first moment of the parameter Royalty indicates that the given 
Royalty Suspension Volume subsidy has no effect on bidding. However, upon closer 
examination of the data distribution and looking at the second moments we find that the 
effects of the Royalty does indeed affect the probability of a bid, but the effect is not  
equal across tracts Another feature of the RPL model is the avoidance of omitted variable   21
bias. If non-constant error variance is assumed and heteroskedasticity is present, then 
variables in the model will be interacting with an omitted variable in the form of 
differences in the distribution of the error term across tracts.  
  One limitation of the model is that it is only appropriate for explaining the effect 
of the DWRRA, since we used several leading variables in the regression. An extension 
of this research is to incorporate oil price futures into the model so that it can be used for 
forecasting purposes. Also, an out of sample statistical validation procedure such as a 
jackknife may be used to examine the predictive capabilities of the model.    22
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Table 1. Variable Definitions 
Variable       Mea  n
2      Definition 
1. Dependent Variable: 
 
Prob_Bid          0.003 (0.058)    whether tract was bid on that year         
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
2. Independent Variables: 
 
a) Geographical/ Distance Proxies
3: 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Distance        785.996  (404.409)  distance in miles to nearest successful field           
 
Density12          11.834 (14.040)      density of active leases in 12 mile radius         
 
Density30          65.278 (67.228)      density of active leases in 30 mile radius            
 
Reject(-1)          0.203 (14.127)        =1 bid was rejected last period, = 0 if was not rejected 
 
VNField          0.186 (0.388)        tract is very near anther successful field, less than 10 miles    
       
NField        0.467 (0.498)        tract is near anther successful field, less than 31 miles          
         
VNDiscovery        0.204 (0.403)        tract is very near anther successful discovery, less than 7 miles  
 
NDiscovery        0.217 (0.412)        tract is near anther successful discovery, less than 31 miles      
         
Fields7        0.433 (0.992)        number of fields within 7 mile radius        
 
Fields31        11.628 (19.086)        number of fields within 31 mile radius         
 
Well31Y4        5.977 (46.102)        number of wells in 31 mile radius the past 4 years 
 
Well7Y4        0.361 (3.823)        number of wells in 7 mile radius the past 4 years 
 
DSY2D31        0.812 (1.705)        distance to well, within past two years 
 
Structures7        1.458 (6.494)        number of structures in 7 mile radius 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
b) Tract Specific Attributes: 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Returned(1)          0.052 (0.221)        tract was returned last period      
 
PriorLeases          0.242 (0.558)        number of leases in prior years for the tract            
 
Produced           0.021 (0.143)        =0 if has not produced in past, =1 if has produced          
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
c. Economics Variables 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
SIC211(5)          81.931 (30.401)       producer price index in 5 years, when lease expires, for oil and  
              gas industry SIC code 211    
      
OilPrice(1)          28.812 (9.529)        leading oil price next year   
  
NetInc(1)          13.557 (7.854)    leading net income next year  
 
Royalty        0.155 (0.362)        before and after DWRRA 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
d. Other Exogenous/Weather Variables 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
USHUR          1.862 (1.761)              number of hurricanes in US waters 
 
HUR          8.115 (5.284)              number of worldwide hurricanes      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                                 
2 Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
3 According to the Manual of Oil and Gas Terms, a “field” is an area scientifically known to have oil and know to be economically 
recoverable; a “discovery” is a recently found field within two years;  a “well” is where a hole has been drilled; and a “structure” is 
where physical platforms exists. Table 2: Random Parameter Logit Regression Results- Base Model  
Variable    Random Parameters in Utility Function          Derived δ
2 of Parameters Distributions 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
   Coefficeint  St.  Err.         Coefficient     St.  Err. 
a) Geographical/ Distance Proxies: 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Distance    -0.013    0.020          0.001***        0.001                  
 
Density12    0.161***    0.028          0.0218        0.027        
 
Density30    0.017***    0.005          0.004        0.006        
 
Reject(-1)    -5.586***    1.318       1.806      1.215   
 
VNField    -1.530    1.005          1.254        0.889           
       
NField  2.410    1.693       0.020      1.354         
         
VNDiscovery -1.074**   0.581        0.642*      0.380       
 
NDiscovery  -10.722    19.848          0.401          0.363      
         
Fields7  0.578    0.039       0.984**      0.524               
 
Fields31  -0.004    0.038          0.108***        0.039       
 
Well31Y4  -0.001    0.039       0.002      0.002 
 
Well7Y4  -0.016    0.039       0.100***      0.041 
 
DSY2D31  -0.057    0.072       0.435***      0.136 
 
Structures7  -0.244***    0.114       0.129      0.167 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
b.  Tract Specific Attributes 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Returned(1)    2.513***    0.294            0.870***        0.350       
 
PriorLeases    2.160***    0.353          0.682**        0.359             
 
Produced(1)     0.792    0.548           2.540***        0.952              
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
c. Economics Variables 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
SIC211(5)    0.007**   0.004       0.004      0.004     
      
OilPrice(1)    0.030***    0.009       0.047***      0.018       
  
NetInc(5)    0.016    0.015       0.0019      0.023         
 
Royalty  0.649    0.473       4.036***      0.988 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
d.. Other Exogenous/Weather Variables 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
USHUR    0.086    0.062            0.140          0.113       
      
HUR    0.119***    0.019          0.015        0.031       
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
No.  of  Observations    14436                
Log-Likelihood  at  Zero    -1360.062                              
Log-Likelihood at Convergence    -618.981                             
Adjusted McFadden’s ρ
2    0.5390                    
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Note: ***, **, * significant at 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively.   25
Table3: Random Parameter Logit Regression Results- Slope Dummy Model  
 
Variable    Random Parameters in Utility Function          Derived δ
2 of Parameters Distributions 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
   Coefficeint  St.  Err.         Coefficient     St.  Err. 
a) Geographical/ Distance Proxies: 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
dDistance    -0.011    0.023          0.001        0.001                
 
dDensity12    0.196***    0.035          0.001        0.038        
 
dDensity30    0.018***    0.007          0.002        0.011        
 
Reject(-1)    -11.040***  3.564       4.558***      1.997 
 
VNField    -1.570    1.199          0.336        1.856           
       
NField  2.778    1.954       0.061      1.804   
         
VNDiscovery -1.290   0.673        0.191      0.763       
 
NDiscovery  -9.931    23.381          0.330         0.793      
         
dFields7  0.761    0.553       0.005      0.005               
 
dFields31  -0.002    0.045          0.005        0.005       
 
dWell31Y4  -0.001    0.002       0.001      0.002 
 
dWell7Y4  -0.022    0.037       0.004      0.049 
 
dDSY2D31  -0.039    0.076       0.011      0.162 
 
dStructures7  -0.305**    0.172       0.0435      0.306 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
b. Tract Specific Attributes 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Returned(1)    2.793***    0.359            0.007        0.667     
 
dPriorLeases    2.692***    0.544          2.399**        0.606             
 
Produced(1)     1.367    0.655           0.321        1.374              
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
c2. Economics Variables 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
dSIC211(5)    0.003    0.004       0.001      0.007     
 
dOilPrice(1)    0.019    0.018       0.123***      0.049       
  
dNetInc(5)    0.007    0.017       0.064***      0.039   
 
Royalty  0.406    0.796       7.188***      2.926       
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
d. Other Exogenous/Weather Variables 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
dUSHUR    0.065    0.084            0.433***        0.152      
      
dHUR    0.151***    0.024          0.008        0.082       
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
No.  of  Observations    14436                
Log-Likelihood  at  Zero    -1360.0625                              
Log-Likelihood at Convergence    -607.0045                             
Adjusted McFadden’s ρ
2    0 . 5 4 8 8 0                     
Note: ***, **, * significant at 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively. 